

Race, migration and neoliberalism

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As Stuart Hall and Alan O'Shea argued in an earlier instalment of this manifesto, common sense is a form of everyday thinking that offers us frameworks of meaning with which to make sense of the world:

It is a form of popular, easily-available knowledge which contains no complicated ideas, requires no sophisticated argument and does not depend on deep thought or wide reading. It works intuitively, without forethought or reflection. It is pragmatic and empirical, giving the illusion of arising directly from experience, reflecting only the realities of daily life and answering the needs of 'the common people' for practical guidance and advice.¹

This understanding about how common sense operates is particularly useful in trying to unpack the complex articulations between race, migration and nation that inform current debate, and the particular ways in which these ideas are mobilised within neoliberal ideology.

The common sense of a society contains within its mix of ideas 'stone age elements' and 'prejudices from all past phases of history': previous ways of understanding the world leave their mark on popular ways of thinking.² Each political formation draws on a repertoire of elements to create its own forms of hierarchy and patterns of exclusion and inclusion. In Britain especially, common sense on race is suffused with relics from its past imperial history, though it also draws on other elements, such as feudal beliefs about the divine right to rule, or a

Shakespearean celebration of the happy few at Agincourt. These and other accretions have left what Gramsci describes as ‘stratified deposits’ in our ideas about Britishness, Englishness, ethnicity and difference.

The long centuries of global domination have left many traces. Racism in contemporary Britain remains heavily influenced by the colonial period, when it was seen by Europeans as natural that white men ruled black people, and the civilising mission was the white man’s burden. And the contemporary global inequality that is a direct legacy of colonial history strongly reinforces these attitudes, since it does in fact reflect a continuing reality about who holds power and wealth in the world. Openly racist ideas are rarely expressed in western discourse in the twenty-first century, but race is nevertheless omnipresent within its culture (most notably in much of the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’). Media images of over-crowded boats and immigrant bodies washing up on the Mediterranean shores of the EU, or shrouded, anonymous and abject prisoners in Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib, or the pictures of Ebola victims that reproduce the ubiquitous imagery of African victimhood – none of these is overtly presented as being ‘about race’, but they are carriers for common sense ideas about the natural order of the world.

Ideas about British values and the general inferiority of foreigners are mobilised most often in current debates in the notion that ‘our small island’ is being over-run by immigrants from Europe, but one of the reasons this view is taken up by the media and populist politicians so readily is that they have a long tradition to draw on: a treasure trove of familiar stories about the good old days – Blighty, imperial adventure, autumn mists and beer – as well as a well-stocked supply of horror stories about people who don’t belong – muggings, gangs, people speaking foreign languages on trains, veiled women on the British high street.

The broad outlines of the story – there are too many of them, ‘they’ are not like ‘us’, they are a threat, they are criminal, they are illegal, they will swamp us, they are taking things that rightfully belong to us – have been deployed in the same but different configurations for every wave

of migration to Britain (almost always driven by the desire for cheap labour). These stories have particular embellishments in particular periods, but they go back at least as far as the industrial revolution, and start with the vilification of the Irish (of course the long history of anti-semitism stretches back even further). Migration tends to be accompanied by tales of people who, because they are not like us, are not seen as fully human – or certainly as not entitled to the same rights as us.

Other countries have their own versions of these stories. As Agri Ismail observes of Swedish right-wing populists, ‘their definition of what deviates from the norm always corresponds to those who have arrived most recently’. Ismail illustrates this point with a story about Swedish migrants to the US, who had their own experiences of not being considered white. He quotes a 1901 letter from a lumberjack who complains about his workplace because there are ‘probably 15 white men here to 60 Swedes’; he describes the Swedes as ‘beasts’ who smell of herring: ‘Walking behind a string of Swedes is something impossible to a person with a delicate nose’.³ Being in the wrong place at the wrong time can apparently make any ethnic group – even the Nordic Swedes – seem not white enough. As this example illustrates, it is those of lowly status who tend to be regarded as lacking whiteness.

Conversely, the term immigrant is not often associated with more affluent migrants, for example Americans (of whom more than 200,000 currently live in Britain), or Germans (more than 300,000). The rhetoric that surrounds immigration and race most often finds its pariahs in over-crowded hostels or sweat shops.

Broadly speaking, whiteness is associated with higher status and wealth, while blackness is associated with poverty and abjection. In this sense race forms part of an ideological repertoire that asserts the rightness for the job of ruling of those from the rich white world – and the lack of qualification for such a role of the poor majority. Race is as much about whiteness as blackness – and ideas about white superiority are most often expressed these days in terms of western civilisational superiority.

Race and neoliberalism

Though theories of the market, neoliberal or otherwise, are not themselves racialised (not least since they deal in inputs of labour rather than human beings), the functioning of the contemporary global economy is deeply embedded in the histories and practices of racism. The operations of the market are always underpinned by unequal power structures; and the maintenance as far as possible of unequal global power relations has been a key concern of the global elite throughout the postcolonial period. The continuance of a dominant common sense of the whiteness of power as natural – including who is entitled to intervene internationally and which societies best embody a specific normative set of western values – has been a crucial part of securing consent for these unequal relations.⁴

Common-sense ideas about British and/or western values have much to contribute here. For example western ways of fighting are regarded as much more civilised than those of jihadis: death by drone is seen as a more modern means of despatch than beheading. Similarly, lack of democracy is more acceptable (often invisible) when it is part of the British story: thus, for example, the complete absence of democracy under British rule in Hong Kong is forgotten in the current debate about the lack of democracy under the People's Republic.

The way migration is discussed fits into the same hierarchy of entitlement. It is assumed that people from the rich west can go wherever they want, but the poor will by and large stay where they are. The supreme example of this one-way view of migration is the invisibility in much contemporary discussion of the mass European/white settler migrations of the nineteenth century, especially to North and South America, the Antipodes and Southern Africa, which led to the dispossession, subordination and sometimes eradication of whole populations, with all the consequent inequality and violence that this has brought to the world. Today, as neoliberal capitalism spreads its grip across the globe in search of new sources of raw materials and new markets, it produces levels of dispossession and displacement even greater than those that caused the

nineteenth-century emigrations. But for twenty-first century victims of capitalism's great destructive capacity, moving away for a better life follows a very different pattern. The movement of populations that has characterised the whole of the modern period is called into question when the periphery seeks to come to the centre.

There is of course no such thing as a pure market. Liberals may dream of the free movement of goods and people, but securing the conditions in which this can happen requires massive intervention and investment. This is why liberals and conservatives have so often ended up in coalition together. Through their uneasy alliance the necessary law and order is secured by the conservative/authoritarian/populist wing to enable the liberals to pursue their free trade. The contradictions this involves are seen very clearly in debates on immigration. The lure of cheap labour has to be balanced against the need to patch together the necessary alliances of populists and conservatives that will keep the system afloat. The ideas about race and nation that are submerged just beneath the surface of this debate – and which seek to hold together an alliance between the wealthy and a working class addressed in national rather than class terms – are usually unmentioned but are nevertheless present. In Britain the Liberal Democrats, unsurprisingly, are the strongest enthusiasts for liberal policies such as support for the EU and fewer controls on immigration, but in the Labour and Tory parties there are major divisions between conservatives and liberals (as there are indeed in most of the smaller parties).

Discourses of white/English/British superiority can thus be seen as a resource deployed to help secure cross-class alliances between disaffected sections of the working class and the authoritarian populist right. As well as helping to secure consent for western dominance at the global level, they therefore play a key role in domestic politics.

Neoliberal meritocracy

A third key way in which racialised forms of common sense help sustain neoliberal hegemony is the role they play in naturalising privilege. We

are encouraged not to notice that the biggest factor in determining people's life chances is the relative wealth of the families they are born into. Racialised thinking is thus closely related to another stalwart of neoliberal common sense – meritocracy. The idea that those who are at the top are there because of merit necessarily implies that those who are under-represented lack merit in some way. (And the corollary is that lack of success must be linked to a failure to work hard, or to personal flaws such as laziness, criminality or parasitism.)

The refusal to acknowledge the existence of the networks of advantage, patronage and power that maintain the rich in their position is damaging to everyone whose life is structured by inequality – whether this is connected to race, class, gender or other forms of structural inequality. As David Theo Goldberg has argued, meritocracy refuses any acknowledgement of the role racism plays in everyday structures of society; it masks racism through its apparent espousal of a moral commitment to opportunity for all.⁵

The current dominance of exclusionary language in political discourse (where it is also used as a means of whittling away support for universal forms of welfare provision) feeds into institutional racism and the assumptions it makes about people who are 'like us' or 'not like us'. It harms people who are somehow deemed not to have the right qualities to be leaders. It makes assumptions about who does and doesn't belong in the top institutions.

Shifting settlements

Another way of tracing the relationship between discourses on race and migration and neoliberalism is to see how they have changed over time, as the social democratic settlement has been gradually dismantled. An over-arching feature of this change has been the shift from an emphasis (however imperfectly executed) on equality and tackling structural inequality towards a focus on individual rights and equality of opportunity.

Stuart Hall's innovative analysis in both *Policing the Crisis* and his

later work on Thatcherism showed the important role played by race in the shift towards ‘authoritarian populism’ at the end of the 1970s.⁶ In *Policing the Crisis* Stuart and his co-authors produced the earliest conjunctural analysis of what we first thought of as Thatcherism, then Thatcher/Reaganism and ultimately neoliberalism. As part of this endeavour they analysed the political terrain that produced the 1970s moral panic over ‘mugging’, and showed how this newly created and strongly racialised category of crime tapped into common sense feelings about Britishness and law and order.⁷ This sense of law and order as being part of the traditional British way of life helped to build a new populist alliance in an era in which the world as we knew it seemed to be collapsing, after the ‘1968 moment’. Traditional values were portrayed as being under threat from strikers, protesters, hippies and immigrants – and ‘alien black elements’ were seen an integral part of the enemy within (*Politics of Thatcherism*, pp24-5).

References to race and immigration have been a consistent part of the mobilising repertoire of the authoritarian aspect of neoliberalism since the 1970s – in fact they began as far back as the Powell period, which first put this set of ideas into political play. (Powell was an important precursor of aspects of Thatcherism.) Stuart wrote of the ‘magical connections and short-circuits that Powellism was able to establish between the themes of race and immigration control and the images of the nation, the British people and the destruction of “our culture, our way of life”’ (*Politics of Thatcherism*, p38). Paul Gilroy wrote: ‘The right has created a language of nation which gains populist power from calculated ambiguities that allow it to transmit itself as a language of “race”’ (*Ain’t No Black*, p29).

There was of course, opposition to this populist mobilisation of concerns about race and migration. Black organisations, and movements of solidarity between black and white people, were also developing during this period, and people were also trying to develop new theories about cultural identity and belonging. The 1970s also saw the beginnings of discussions about multiculturalism – an idea frequently derided by all mainstream parties these days, but one whose

origins lay precisely in the recognition of the fact that society was becoming more multicultural – and that this was something to be welcomed rather than feared. The GLC, under Ken Livingstone’s leadership from 1981 to 1986, represented probably the most successful coming together of all these strands, though other centres of municipal socialism, with similar policies, also flourished at this time. The movement for Labour Party Black Sections also took off in the early 1980s and this led to the election of four black Labour MPs in 1987. These can be seen as rear-guard actions to defend an old-style politics of equality in the face of the emerging new regime.

Race was at the heart of political battles during the transition to Thatcherism. The ‘loony left’ was a term invented in the mid-1980s to disparage both the left and the new movements for equality: by being associated with each other, mad shop stewards, mad feminists and mad anti-racists could each add layers of looniness to the others’ image. The term ‘loony left’ thus always resonated with a message about race. The defeat of the left by Thatcher, which led to the eventual defeat of the left within Labour, was also a defeat for anti-racism and black politics, as was perhaps most obviously seen in the Thatcher government’s abolition of the GLC and the Metropolitan County Councils.

When Labour was elected in 1997, the supporters of equality in the party had not yet lost all influence, and New Labour had not yet evolved its own distinctive take on these issues. The government at first seemed quite promising. In 1998, only one year into government, it instituted the Macpherson report into the murder of Stephen Lawrence, and in 2000 it introduced the Race Relations (Amendment) Act, which strengthened legislation on equality, including some changes recommended in the Macpherson report. Also in 2000, however, the New Labour leadership, with Home Secretary Jack Straw taking the lead, disassociated themselves from the Parekh report on the future of multi-ethnic Britain, which they themselves had commissioned. This was a signal of Labour’s shift away from an ‘Old Labour’ position on race and migration. As Ben Carrington has put it, ‘state multiculturalism lasted about three years in Britain’.⁸

As the New Labour clique started to consolidate its grip on the Labour Party, they began to move away from framing the debate in terms of equality and began instead to argue for a more liberal, rights-based, ‘modernising’ approach. As Judith Squires pointed out in a 2004 *Soundings* article, some important shifts in the New Labour approach to equality could be seen in the debates that led up to the establishment of the single equality commission, the Equality and Human Rights Commission.⁹ In particular Judith points to a new location of equality issues within the modernising agenda, with an increasing emphasis on their importance for economic productivity – equality was ‘good for business as well as individuals’. She quotes Barbara Roche (who was a minister in the Blair government from 1997 to 2003, including a stint as Minister of State for Asylum and Immigration from 1999 to 2001) at the 2002 TUC: ‘a diverse workforce gives employers a competitive edge’. Barbara Roche is still a strong defender of the value of immigration to the national economy, and as Chair of Migration Matters continues to define this in purely economic terms: ‘plugging skills gaps, boosting output and bolstering our recovery’.¹⁰

A further consequence of the establishment of the Equality and Human Rights Commission was a running together of the six kinds of inequalities it was set up to deal with – three of which (gender, race and disability) had previously had their own bodies, now abolished; all these specific issues were now to be addressed through the discourse of ‘rights’, with far less consideration being given to the specific histories and cultures that had generated particular forms of structural inequality. This too can be understood as part of the shift towards seeing problems of inequality in individual terms.

Communitarianism

The Cattle report of 2001 was central to another major shift in Labour policy. Published after the Oldham race riots in the same year, the report correctly noted the problems of segregation in Oldham, and to a certain extent the problems of racism faced by the local Pakistani community;

but it saw the solution to the problem as policies to promote ‘cohesion’, rather than an effort to address the material causes of poverty and segregation, or to tackle racism. And in the end the responsibility for cohesion came to be placed upon the Pakistani population, who were asked to try harder to integrate.¹¹ This emphasis on cohesion reflected the communitarian turn in Labour thinking, which was also eventually taken up by the Tories under David Cameron. Communitarianism is good social cover for neoliberalism because it is an amorphous, seemingly neutral concept that has no links with political economy: it allows for discussion of social issues but without making any connections to the material forces which shape them.

New Labour’s communitarianism had been directly conceived of as a repositioning from ‘old’ Labour ideas (the new clause 4 can be understood as replacing the concept of class with that of community). Its policies on cohesion were in the same spirit – and involved not only a disavowal of the need to address structures of inequality, but a shift of responsibility from national government on to individuals or ‘communities’. In 2004 David Goodhart added a further twist with the idea (shocking then, but everyday now) that Britain was possibly ‘too diverse to sustain the mutual obligations behind a good society and the welfare state’.¹² ‘Community’ thus first displaced equality, and then became itself the grounds for exclusion. Indeed the common-sense concept of community has become increasingly exclusionary as it has become ever more entangled with a politics of us and them that seeks to defend the local against the global.¹³

Shifts in Europe

The European Union has also made a big shift in the neoliberal direction since the 1980s, particularly with the Maastricht treaty of 1992 (whose ‘social chapter’ however, was still too much for the Major government, which negotiated an opt-out). Successive British governments have played a leading role in pushing change in this direction. In particular Britain was a strong supporter of the major

expansion in 2004, when ten new countries, mainly from the former communist block, joined the Union, which had the effect of a further massive dilution of social Europe. For the existing EU member states, the new East European members were seen as offering a source of new markets, cheap labour and investment opportunities, and the pre-accession treaties made privatisation and liberalisation central to the negotiations.¹⁴ The effect of the ‘shock therapy’ administered by the west during the ‘transition time’ of these countries has been to create a zone of peripheral economies within Europe whose main enterprises are now owned by international companies, and whose competitiveness is based on cheap labour – and this has had a knock-on effect throughout the EU. There is now a large supply of cheap labour, which causes downward pressure on wages across the EU, while the intensification of privatisation in the East has helped entrench the domination of business interests across the union; what’s more, the local populations have often expressed their discontent with the rapid dissolution of their security through support for the populist and far right parties, which has strengthened the political representation of this tendency within European institutions.

As is now well known, the accession of the Eastern European economies in fact led to greater migration to Britain than had been expected, which meant that the decade to 2011 saw record levels of net immigration to Britain (an annual average of 197,000 over the decade). This represented a shift from earlier patterns of migration, which had mainly been from countries that had formerly been British colonies, and migration now became linked in the popular imagination with Europe.

Flexible labour markets that keep down wage costs are at the heart of the neoliberal project. Neoliberal governments usually disavow this intention, however: for them migration is good for growth – another term devoid of human content.¹⁵ However, in order to create an alliance that will keep them in power they very often have to find a way of securing the consent of those whose ways of life are being destroyed by globalisation – who, in the words of Carl Rowlands, ‘want to escape modernity’.

This is when migrants become people – people who are taking jobs and overwhelming the welfare state, the visible representatives of globalisation on a street near you. In populist rhetoric Europe has now become the symbol of everything that threatens UK security. As James Meek argued after his recent visit to Thanet, a place where a very large part of the local economy – including utilities, shops and public services operated by private contractors – is run by large companies whose headquarters are overseas: ‘There’s plenty of evidence in Thanet to support Ukip’s general proposition that local power is being diminished while the power of remote, faceless authorities is growing’.¹⁶ But, as Meek also points out, the success of UKIP and other populist politicians has been to identify those faceless authorities with ‘Europe’ and to associate ‘Europe’ with immigration.

As Ed Miliband has correctly identified, the problem of migrant workers being used to undermine local wages and conditions is a real one, to be addressed by measures to defend minimum levels of wages and conditions. In other words this is a problem of unequal relations between capital and labour, to be addressed by state and or collective intervention (not that he is able to express it in this way). But this kind of argument is very difficult to make in the current climate. In the Tory party, Boris Johnson and a diminishing band of others continue to support migration on business grounds, as do the CBI. But this is not the case the left should be making. (The rest of the Tories seem to have decided to give up on their move away from nastiness, though re-reading Ben Carrington’s piece reminded us of what now seem impossible scenes at the Tory party conference of 2007. After Cameron had attacked Gordon Brown’s call for British jobs for British workers – ‘we’ve got to be better than that’ – his standing ovation was accompanied by the playing of Jimmy Cliff’s ‘You can get it if you really want it’, in what was a consciously multicultural gesture, albeit with a song that was lyrically on message.)

Debate takes place on two completely separate levels: the macro-economic level, where there is argument over the economic effects of migration; and the common sense everyday level, where exclusionary

discourses are so well entrenched that there is scarcely any contestation. Iain Duncan Smith recently dismissed a report by UCL academics Christian Dustmann and Dr Tommaso Frattini – which defended European immigration between 2001 and 2011 on the economic grounds of the fiscal benefits to the UK – on the grounds that it was ‘silly’. Summarising the report as ‘Oh look in tax terms they have contributed more’, his riposte was: ‘First of all you have to take them all the way through to when they get older and they actually start taking from the state’; and then: ‘You don’t account for the fact that often in many communities they literally change the schooling because so many people arrive not speaking English. You have then got problems you know with local services, transport all that kind of stuff’.¹⁷ (Perhaps this is where Nigel Farage got the idea of blaming immigrants for the state of the M4.)

This response frames migrants as being unentitled to normal services and benefits even if they have paid tax all their lives, and is also located within a wider stance that seeks to characterise the welfare state in terms of people ‘taking’ things. It makes no attempt to engage with the statistics, in the confident knowledge that no-one in the mainstream press will be remotely interested in such niceties. (There are many complex arguments to be made about the economic effects of immigration but there is not space here to engage in them in any detail. There were indeed some problems for service provision in areas most affected by the bulge in migration after European expansion in 2004, but these were largely due to the unplanned and unregulated nature of the flow of labour, which took place without any consideration of the human needs of either those who migrated or existing residents.) In fact this IDS attempt at common sense shows neoliberalism at its starkest. It is obvious that a flow of people will require services, that some will have children, and some will become ill or even grow old. But the ideal of neoliberalism is a worker with no rights and no social or familial existence. Cheap overseas labour could be even cheaper if workers could be denied the usual rights of citizens (and there is an additional benefit if they can be blamed for the underfunding of public services and lack of

affordable housing). Thus with one claw neoliberalism beckons workers in, while with another it seeks to strip them of their humanity.

Labour, UKIP and class

In 'The Great Moving Right Show' Stuart also discusses the contradictions in Labour that mean it tends to acquiesce in populist discourses. He argues that once Labour became established as a governmental force it had to change its articulation from one that was 'class-to-party' to one that was 'people-to-nation' (p27 *Politics of Thatcherism*).¹⁸ It had to seek solutions for the crisis (in this case the 1970s political crisis) within the already existing framework – 'within the limits of capitalist survival'. Stuart makes these points in discussing how the national interest could be set against 'sectional interests' of all kinds, including 'greedy' trade unionists. But forty years later, including two decades of New Labour, we can see that this disarticulation from class has had wider ramifications, particularly given the widespread adoption of a communitarian sensibility in discussions about the nation.

The problem for Labour is that the mantle of speaking for the working class has been taken on by UKIP. As Ewa Jasiewicz has written:

When you take class identity out of who we are, when you take away any pride in the working-class history of resistance that has won us our rights at work and more, then class becomes not a 'them and us' of workers and bosses, but entwined with race, insiders and outsiders, the hardworking deserving poor and the hardworking, immigrant undeserving poor.¹⁹

As she argues, people who talk about 'foreigners taking jobs' are not necessarily racist. But the problem is that they don't ask who it is that is giving these jobs to 'cheaper, casualised, more compliant workers'. UKIP, through 'addressing British-born victims of neoliberalism' – talking to workers about work but without talking about power and wealth – are seeking to yoke these sentiments to an exclusionary

politics that discourages investigation of underlying power structures. The left needs to do something different: to construct a popular national politics that recognises the value of human diversity, and builds an alliance that brings together a popular majority that can encompass class and other forms of inequality, and is capable of challenging the unaccountable power of the elite. In doing this we could do worse than revisit some of the inclusive politics of the GLC and Metropolitan Councils. The resort to a defensive politics of belonging is an understandable response to the impersonal forces of globalisation. We need to challenge this with an inclusive politics that makes a more accurate identification of those remote, faceless authorities.

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Notes

1. The notion of common sense has been a recurring theme in this manifesto and in the work of Stuart Hall more generally. See the chapter on common sense neoliberalism in this Manifesto, and the seminal text produced by people from the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, *The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 1970s Britain*, published in 1982.
2. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Lawrence & Wishart 1971, p324.
3. Agri Ismail, 'The pioneers of global gentrification', first published in *Glänta*, February 2014 (English version in Eurozine: www.eurozine.com), quoting Philip J. Anderson and Dag Blanck, *Swedes in the Twin Cities: Immigrant Life and Minnesota's Urban Frontier*, Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2001, p17.
4. See Michael Rustin and Doreen Massey's chapter 'Rethinking the neoliberal world order', and see also the section in Beatrix Campbell's instalment on postcolonial violence.
5. David Theo Goldberg, *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning*, Blackwell 1993.
6. Stuart Hall, 'The Great Moving Right Show', *Marxism Today*, Jan 1979, available at www.amielandmelburn.org.uk, *Marxism Today* section; also

in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (eds), *Politics of Thatcherism*, L&W 1983. The key chapters in *Policing the Crisis* (referred to by Stuart in the MT article) are 'Exhaustion of consent' and 'Towards the exceptional state': Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts, *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order* 1978, reprinted by Palgrave in 2013.

7. Paul Gilroy develops this argument in *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack* (Hutchinson 1987), in his chapter 'Lesser breeds without the law'. The pattern of policing of black communities established in the 1970s and 1980s remains deeply entrenched today. So too does the routine reporting of the ethnicity of non-white perpetrators of crime – as in 'Polish rapist', 'Asian paedophile', 'foreign criminal'.
8. Ben Carrington, 'Where's the white in the union jack', in Mark Perryman (ed), *Imagined Nation*, L&W 2008, p117.
9. Judith Squires, 'Equality and New Labour', *Soundings* 27, autumn 2004.
10. www.migrationmatterstrust.co.uk.
11. The background of 9/11 and the 'war on terror' clearly also fed into changing attitudes towards multiculturalism, but the main focus of this chapter is on the relationship between neoliberal politics, race and migration: it has not been possible to give full consideration here to the equally complex relationships between liberal interventionism and race.
12. David Goodhart, 'Too diverse', *Prospect*, Feb 2004.
13. For more on this see Nira Yuval Davis, 'The double crisis of governmentality and accountability', *Soundings* 52, pp94-5.
14. See Carl Rowlands, 'Europe's periphery', *Soundings* 46, winter 2010.
15. On the emptying of human content from economic discussion see Doreen Massey in her manifesto contribution 'Vocabularies of the economy'. It is in particular notable that in economic discussion the impact of migration is most often discussed in terms of GDP or growth, which are indices that are less and less connected to any notion of the general well-being.
16. James Meek, 'In Farageland', *LRB*, October 2014
17. Quoted in *Guardian*, 16.11.14.
18. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but the notion of the 'people' is complex and needs to be politically constructed – see Ernesto Laclau, 'Why constructing the people is the main task of radical politics', in *Critical Enquiry* 32, summer 2006; and *On Populist Reason* (Verso 2005).
19. Comment is free, *Guardian*, 29.5.14.